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Abstract:
This study develops a Habermasian framework for evaluating and
generating challenges to organizational legitimacy. The launch of the
SaveDisney.com web site represents an innovative example of an Internetbased activist public successfully challenging a corporation’s legitimacy and
advocating for changes in corporate governance. Legitimacy research has
focused on strategies used by organizations to build legitimacy (e.g., Dowling
& Pfeffer, 1975; Metzler, 2001), but scholars rarely address how publics
challenge legitimacy claims. Using Habermas’ conceptualization of
communicative action and legitimacy to explore the SaveDisney.com case
offers insight into ways that activist publics successfully challenge and reject
the legitimacy claims of powerful corporations.

In today’s ever-changing global landscape, organizations must
constantly monitor their perceived legitimacy in relation to increasingly
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widespread audiences. However, legitimation research has tapered off
in recent years and has not fully considered public challenges to
legitimacy. Legitimacy is understood as the congruence between public
expectations and organizational actions and values (Dowling & Pfeffer,
1975; Suchman, 1995), and legitimation is an essential process for all
organizations, even being articulated as the core of all strategic
communication practice (Metzler, 2001). The recent Internet-based
SaveDisney campaign is a multifaceted case of an organizational public
challenging an organization’s legitimacy, offering an opportunity to
explore challenges to corporate legitimacy.
The Walt Disney Company once again found itself in the media
spotlight in late 2003, this time due to the split between the Walt
Disney Company and former board members, Roy Disney and Stanley
Gold. These resignations also signaled the beginning of an activist
campaign that both called the Disney Company’s management
practices into question and sought a change in leadership for the
company.
The campaign centerpiece was the web site SaveDisney.com,
which chronicled the pairs’ efforts and serves as a striking example of
changes in the landscape of activist publics and their interactions with
organizations. The campaign was hailed as a historic shareholder
revolt and represents a less researched form of activism, in which
publics organize around issues of corporate governance rather than
environmental or political issues.
The use of the web site as a primary communication vehicle also
highlights the increased use of technology in strategic communication
practice. This use of technology provides greater access to more
shareholders, thus generating greater participation. As such, the case
of SaveDisney is also unique because it challenges conventional
approaches to viewing publics as passive recipients of organizational
attempts to build legitimacy1, since various publics including
employees, shareholders, and fans were actively engaged in
challenging the legitimacy of Disney Company practices. A trend of
shareholders voicing concerns and questioning corporate practices with
increasing frequency warrants a renewed focus on organizational
legitimacy that examines the role of publics and their ability to actively
engage with organizational discourses. This study seeks to answer
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these calls within communication research by showing how a return to
and incorporation of Jürgen Habermas’s legitimacy (1984, 1987)
enhances the explanatory power of legitimacy theory in terms of the
role for publics in the legitimation process. Specifically, a Habermasian
framework for legitimacy offers explanations of how and why
legitimacy claims made by organizations around the world succeed,
fail, and are challenged by activist publics such as SaveDisney.
In order to understand the implications of the SaveDisney
campaign for research and practice in organizational legitimacy, we
first address existing research on activist publics and organizational
legitimacy. We then explicate a theoretical framework for
understanding and assessing challenges to legitimacy based on
Habermas’s theory of communicative action. This framework is then
applied to the SaveDisney case. We conclude by offering suggestions
for future research in the area of organizational legitimacy and dialogic
public relations.

Literature Review
Renewed Focus on Publics and Activist Publics
Public relations scholars increasingly cite a need to reconceptualize publics. As Leitch and Neilson (2001) argued,
researchers often do not afford publics any real agency, yet this stance
does not accurately reflect the current organizational environment.
Botan and Taylor (2004) argued for the ways in which publics are
integral to relationship building in public relations research. Publics in
this sense can be viewed as active. Rather than seeing a public as an
amorphous group of passive receivers of information, publics are
“engaged critically as producers and reproducers of the community of
discourse” (Chay-Nemeth, 2001, p. 2).
To date, the area of scholarship answering this call most directly
is research on activist publics. Grunig, Grunig, and Dozier (2002)
defined an activist public as “a group of two or more individuals who
organize in order to influence another public or publics through actions
that may include education, compromise, persuasion, pressure tactics
or force” (p. 446). Activist publics both initiate and are the target of
public relations efforts (Kovacs, 2001), and Smith and Ferguson
(2001) suggested that an activist public’s organization allows it to
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“influence public policy, organizational action or social norms and
values” (p. 292).
Most activist studies either focus on the types of strategic
communication used by activist groups to publicize their issues,
legitimize their own efforts, and influence organizational practices
(e.g., Bullert, 2000; Kovacs, 2001; Patterson & Allen, 1997; Smith &
Ferguson, 2001) or address the ways in which organizational public
relations practitioners can effectively respond to activist campaigns
(e.g., Guiniven, 2002; Hearit, 1999; Taylor, Vasquez, & Doorley,
2003).
Regardless of the focal point (i.e., type of activist group strategy
or organizational response), these studies do not focus on the actual
content of the message strategies employed. Thus, little to no
research exists that addresses issues of how and why activist publics
challenge corporate legitimacy.

Organizational Legitimacy
Most organizational legitimacy reviews begin with Dowling and
Pfeffer’s (1975) conceptualization of legitimacy as a relative fit
between the social values of an organization’s publics and the
organization’s actions. A number of scholars have taken up the task of
defining the concept and understanding legitimation practices (e.g.,
Boulding, 1978; Boyd, 2000; Deephouse, 1996; Epstein & Votaw,
1978; Hearit, 1995; Metzler, 2001; Suchman, 1995). In her review of
organizational legitimacy research, Metzler (2001) noted, “simply
stated, organizational legitimacy is an organization’s right to exist and
conduct operations” (p. 321).
This existing research reveals several things. First, while several
scholars (e.g., Allen & Caillouet, 1994; Coombs, 1992; Francesconi,
1982; Goldzwig & Sullivan, 1995; Meyer & Scott, 1983) focused on
organizational legitimacy efforts over a decade ago, legitimacy studies
seem to have stagnated. This lack of use may be because the research
has not moved beyond describing the legitimacy building strategies
that a particular organization uses.
Dowling and Pfeffer (1975) offered three strategies (change
company policy to match society expectations, change society
expectations to match company policy, and associate company with
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other already legitimated symbols, values, and organizations). Coombs
(1992) provided a more detailed categorization for organizational
legitimacy that described 10 bases or sources for legitimacy-building
strategies. His proposal did suggest that the effectiveness of these
strategies could be evaluated by assessing public response. But
scholars have noted that legitimacy literature does not offer a formal
method for assessing why and how these various strategies might be
effective (Meisenbach & McMillan, 2006). Such an assessment requires
a renewed focus on publics in legitimacy research and a means of
examining the content of claims. In seeking such a framework, we look
to Habermas’s theory of communicative action as a useful perspective
for providing a more nuanced and complex means of examining
organizational legitimacy efforts.

Theoretical Framework: Habermasian Legitimacy
Habermas’s work has been used to analyze public relations
efforts (see, Leeper, 1996) and has been mentioned briefly in analyses
of organizational legitimacy efforts (Boyd, 2000; Leichty & Warner,
2001; Metzler, 2001). In this regard then, there is precedent for using
Habermas’s theory to explicate legitimation. However, current uses of
Habermas have not yet incorporated the full robustness that the
theory offers. We argue that Habermas’s theory of communicative
action provides a more dialogic and content-based means by which
legitimacy claims are assessed. This framework provides a means of
articulating why some claims are more successful than others and
situates legitimacy in the interactive space between organizations and
publics rather than being viewed solely from an organizational
perspective.

Communicative Action
Habermas (1984, 1987) was concerned with systemic barriers
to communicative action in the lifeworld, such as financial and
bureaucratic forces. He advocated balance between system and
lifeworld, but contended that this ideal balance does not currently exist
in society. Instead, the nondiscursive steering media of power and
money have overtaken the public sphere.
Habermas (1984) laid out his remedy in the form of a proposal
for the ideal speech situation. The ideal speech situation is one in
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which all parties are able to engage in open exchange to come to
mutual understanding. This preferred form of interaction is his
communicative action, explained as “the type of interaction in which all
participants harmonize their individual plans of action with one another
and thus pursue their illocutionary aims without reservation” (p. 294).

Validity Claims and Legitimacy
The basis of this harmonizing is the use of criticizable validity
claims. Every utterance must be debatable in that the receivers can
judge whether they see the speaker’s utterance as true, right, and
sincere. Truth of an utterance refers to the veracity of the information
presented in the utterance; rightness incorporates a sense of the
normative understanding of a particular way of acting (i.e., consensus
on underlying values); and the sincerity entails the appropriateness
and sincerity of the utterance being made (Habermas, 1984). Thus,
each utterance contains three types of validity claims (truth, rightness,
and sincerity) that are judged by participants through the process of
communicative action2. Organizations and publics are active
participants in the legitimation of validity claims.
Beyond the criteria outlined for legitimacy claims, Habermas’s
communicative action calls for interaction in which all parties have
equal access to participate in communication exchanges. Distorted
communication represents those instances in which access for
participation is blocked and all voices are not heard in a discussion.
Habermas argued that all speakers in the public sphere have a
responsibility to remove these barriers to communication.
Like many theories, Habermas’s communicative action is not
without its critics. Specifically, Mumby (1988) argued that the reliance
on validity claims does not allow for a consideration of power relations
that are embedded within practice. It is true that Habermas aimed for
a discursive space in which power relations were equal, but he did
recognize that that equality did not typically exist in society. His ideal
speech situation is just that, an ideal toward which individuals and
organizations may strive. Notably, however, Habermas’s ideal is very
similar to Grunig and Hunt’s (1984) ideal of two-way symmetrical
public relations practice (Leitch & Neilson, 2001). We argue that
despite challenges of idealism, the provision of validity claims
addressing truth, right, and sincerity provides a useful and dialogic
International Journal of Strategic Communication, Vol. 1, No. 4 (October 2007): pg. 207-226. DOI. This article is © Taylor
& Francis (Routledge) and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Taylor &
Francis (Routledge) does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere
without the express permission from Taylor & Francis (Routledge).

6

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

avenue for considering how and why publics respond as they do to
legitimacy claims.

Research Statement
Activist efforts provide a ripe ground for considering the ways in
which legitimacy theorizing can be improved. We have shown how
existing legitimacy research lacks analysis of the content and success
of strategies designed to challenge corporate legitimacy. This study
seeks to fill this void by employing a Habermasian framework that
illuminates and helps assess the ways in which legitimacy challenges
are articulated and received. We use this framework to analyze the
ways in which the SaveDisney campaign as activist public generated
ultimately successful challenges to the legitimacy of the Walt Disney
Company.

Analyzing the Case of Disney
The SaveDisney case is unique in that it allows for a thorough
analysis of communication from publics that are challenging the
legitimacy of the company’s practice. Most analyses of legitimacy
begin with an organization’s claim to legitimacy, move on to public
responses, and company rebuttals (Coombs, 1992; Meisenbach,
2006b). In the SaveDisney case, there is no formal and publicly
available claim to legitimacy with which to begin the analysis.
Founded in 1923, The Walt Disney Company is the world’s
second-largest media and entertainment conglomerate, consisting of
five primary business divisions: Media Networks, Studio
Entertainment, Theme Parks and Resorts, and Consumer Products
(Hoovers, 2006; Walt Disney Company, 2006a). At the end of the
2006 fiscal year, the company had 133,000 employees (Hoovers,
2006), and according to Walt Disney Company’s 2006 financial
documents, there were approximately 991,771 common shareholders
(Walt Disney Company, 2006b). While the Walt Disney Company has
enjoyed a great deal of financial success over the years, in the years
leading up to the SaveDisney Campaign, revenue gains had slowed
and income had fallen. In 2000, the company’s net income fell $380
million from the previous year. Then in 2001, two years prior to the
campaign, revenues fell $149 million from the previous year, and the
company recorded a net loss of $158 million (Walt Disney Company,
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2001). The company did rebound in 2002 with total net income of over
$1.2 billion; however, this income still was below the levels of 1999
(Walt Disney Company, 2006). In 2006, after Eisner’s departure,
company revenues were over $34.2 billion with net income of over
$3.3 billion (Walt Disney Company, 2006a).
The issue developed when two individuals issued formal
challenges to the legitimacy of policies in place at the Walt Disney
Company. R. Disney and Gold argued that they had attempted to raise
these challenges within the boardroom at Disney to no avail. Thus, this
legitimacy analysis highlights ways in which and reasons why publics
challenge the legitimacy of an organization’s actions, enhancing the
focus on publics in the legitimation process. The very public and
established challenge mounted by SaveDisney provides the
opportunity for exploring the nuances of the hows and whys involved
in a rejection of a corporation’s claims to legitimacy.
Taking the basic principles of rhetorical analysis outlined by Hart
(1997) and the methods offered by Cheney and McMillan (1990), we
examined the content of the SaveDisney.com web site3, the Walt
Disney Company annual reports, press releases from the Walt Disney
Company and SaveDisney, and media accounts of the events that
unfolded between November, 2003, and February, 2005. We included
all texts that were publicly accessible and restricted media accounts to
major media outlets (New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Time, and
Newsweek). The primary source for this analysis is the
SaveDisney.com web site. The focus here was on the specific
challenges to Disney legitimacy posited by the SaveDisney campaign.
In analyzing the evidence, we began with determining who was
speaking, who was the audience, and what were the primary
arguments made. Our analysis progressed by identifying themes that
emerged across the arguments from the SaveDisney campaign. We
particularly looked for themes related to the framework of
Habermasian legitimacy. Namely, we identified challenges to the truth,
rightness, and sincerity of Walt Disney Company claims.

The Activists’ Campaign
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R. Disney’s and Gold’s resignations from the Walt Disney
Company Board of Directors marked the beginning of a shareholder
revolt that resulted in significant change at the Walt Disney Company.
The centerpiece of the revolt was an external campaign that came to
be known as SaveDisney. The campaign was largely organized around
the web site SaveDisney.com and was accompanied by a series of
speeches, events, and press releases that focused on the overarching
goal of corporate governance reform at the Walt Disney Company.
R. Disney and Gold launched the SaveDisney web site in
December, 2003, shortly after their board resignations. Their
independent web page remained active until August, 2005. The web
site evolved from a basic page that included a short message from R.
Disney explaining the campaign goal to a highly stylized web page that
mimicked Walt Disney Company promotional materials by using Disney
fonts, images, and slogans.
Although the SaveDisney web site took on three major formats
throughout the campaign, the basic features and purposes remained
the same. First, the front page featured a letter from R. Disney, which
updated viewers about the current news and events associated with
the campaign. In addition, the page archived news and editorials
related to changes at the Walt Disney Company. The web page also
included sections that posted letters, press releases, and speeches
authored by the SaveDisney campaign organizers. Another section of
the page included regular “Cast Member Outreach” letters. These
outreach postings were written by R. Disney and targeted all
employees of the Walt Disney Company.
The site was not simply a storage place for campaign
information; rather, the SaveDisney web site was highly interactive. In
addition to all of the information that was available on the site, the
SaveDisney page included letters to the editor, which were authored
by Disney employees (known as cast members), consumers, and fans
of the company. These stakeholders were also invited to participate in
the campaign through the use of interactive polls and occasional
questions, which asked web site visitors to share their Disney
memories.
The campaign spread largely through word of mouth and the
use of an e-mail listserv that was open to any interested supporter of
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the campaign. A link on the SaveDisney web site allowed any visitor to
sign up for the listserv. Those who enrolled received a free bumper
sticker with the campaign’s overarching slogan, “Restore the Magic.”
E-mail messages encouraged list members to forward the e-mail to
others who would want to “join the fight.” The campaign organizers
also publicized the campaign through SaveDisney merchandise that
was available on the web site and through letters mailed directly to
Walt Disney Company shareholders.
The web site served as a forum for discussing the overarching
campaign goal of corporate governance reform. Throughout the
campaign, R. Disney and Gold consistently cited a need for a change in
the way leaders were selected for the company and the ways in which
these leaders made decisions affecting the future of the company.
Their first objective was the removal of Michael Eisner, CEO and Chair
of the Board of Directors. Using the web site, press attention, and
letters to the shareholder, R. Disney and Gold staged a meeting of
revolters just prior to the annual company shareholders meeting in
February, 2004. The SaveDisney campaign is credited with leading to
a vote of no confidence for Michael Eisner, which led to his eventual
resignation. After this success, the campaign continued on and
targeted the succession plan for Eisner and also focused on the
direction of the company. Initially, the campaign organizers railed
against the selection of Bob Iger, a perceived Disney insider, as CEO to
replace Eisner. But, in April, 2005, an agreement was reached by R.
Disney, Gold, and the Walt Disney Company. R. Disney returned to the
company with an emeritus director’s position and the campaign,
known as SaveDisney ended with the web page being taken down in
August, 2005.

Challenges to Corporate Legitimacy
We use the SaveDisney activist campaign as a case for
demonstrating the explanatory power of a Habermasian perspective on
legitimacy. First, we examine how SaveDisney campaign managers
implicitly assumed the desirability of and called for Habermas’s
communicative action. This assumption helps justify the activist
organization’s decision to find a voice via the Internet for itself and its
challenges to the Walt Disney Company. We then use our
conceptualization of Habermas’s validity claims to demonstrate how it
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can enhance understanding of how and why a company’s legitimacy
claims may be challenged by publics.

Call for Communicative Action
“Clearly, though these people [The Walt Disney Board of
Directors] aren’t yet listening as they should. Their arrogance is almost
unbelievable.” These are the words of R. Disney in his welcoming
statement on the SaveDisney web site just after the vote of no
confidence in February, 2004, and they represent one of the key
assumptions of the SaveDisney challenge. From the beginning of this
campaign, the SaveDisney organizers focused on a lack of listening on
the part of the Walt Disney Board of Directors, in general, and Michael
Eisner, in particular. Central to the critique was the contention that
corporate management should allow for open dialogue in which all
parties have opportunity to participate.
Gold’s resignation letter specifically addressed the issue of open
debate as he wrote:
I cannot sit idly by as this Board continues to ignore and
disenfranchise those who raise questions about the
performance of management ...Instead, the Board seems
determined to devote its time and energies to adopting
policies that ...only serve to muzzle and isolate those
Directors who recognize that their role is to be active
participants in shaping the Company and planning for
executive succession. (December 1, 2003)
This notion that the Board was actively seeking to curb dissent
is echoed in R. Disney’s open letter to cast members that was written
on December 3, 2003. R. Disney argued that:
this is a Board that seeks to avoid the constructive tension
necessary to guide management through difficult times.
Instead, it is a Board that seeks to stifle dissent and, to that
end, has asked me to leave the Board of Directors.
Again in a letter to the newly appointed Chairman of the Board on
February 6, 2004, from Michael McConnell, the spokesperson for the
Roy Disney-owned Shamrock Holdings, the need for an open debate of
ideas was highlighted. McConnell questioned the decision to disinvite a
prominent independent corporate analyst from an upcoming Disney
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company meeting: “We believe that trying to aggressively manage the
free flow of ideas and viewpoints among the Company’s many
constituents in this manner is not ‘best practice’ or admirable.”
All of these statements construct an argument for what the
SaveDisney organizers believed should be the interaction between key
stakeholders and corporate managers. The exchange should involve
clear and direct statements, followed by listening, and an engagement
of any voices of dissent. Ultimately, the communication situation that
the SaveDisney campaign advocated is that of the ideal speech
situation and communicative action in which all parties are free to
participate with the final goal of reaching some understanding or
mutual agreement. While this is an “ideal” situation, as the
SaveDisney campaign organizers point out, no such agreement is
possible if the Board fails to listen and actively engage any
disagreements.
Because the SaveDisney campaign relied on this belief in
engaged discussion that explores tension and disagreement, the
rhetoric of the campaign also included a strong call to action of
shareholders, employees, and the public that suggested as interested
parties they should voice their opinions. In this, the argument
acknowledged that for the process to work, those with an opportunity
to participate in discussion should do so. This idea comes through in
repeated calls by R. Disney, Gold and the SaveDisney team for
shareholders, cast members and the public to vote if they are able,
and to send faxes and e-mails. Even as the campaign was ending, this
vision of communicative action was maintained. In the final Cast
Member Outreach letter on April 11, 2005, R. Disney wrote that as
changes were beginning to occur within the Disney management
practices, “hopefully, all Cast Members, will now be given the
opportunity to express their ideas, their thoughts and their hopes for
the direction of their individual divisions and ultimately for the entire
company. So this can be a very good thing.” To the SaveDisney team,
this participatory voice is the hallmark of good corporate governance,
and it is a voice that aligns with Habermas’s communicative action.
Thus, the case demonstrates publics assuming the rightness of a
communicative action process, leading us to consider the content of
the SaveDisney campaign’s powerful challenges to the company’s
legitimacy.
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Truth, Right, and Sincerity of Claims
We begin by examining the SaveDisney campaign through the
lens of organizational legitimacy. The Habermasian perspective allows
us to offer greater explanation of this legitimation process by allowing
for a consideration of how conditions for communicative action are
relevant and by providing a means of identifying the types of
challenges to legitimacy that were made.
Now, we want to know what you actually and honestly think
about it! Do you feel that the CEO search was thoughtfully
carried out? Do you feel that the Board was sincere and
honest to yourselves to the Shareholders and to the Public?
Keep in mind, Dear Cast Members, that the Walt Disney
Company is your company, and you have a right to know the
facts! The Shareholders whom the Board works for has the
right to know! All of us who love the Disney Legacy have a
right to know.
This series of questions was posed by R. Disney and Gold after
George Mitchell, the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Walt
Disney Company, wrote to all Disney cast members explaining how
Bob Iger had been selected as the new CEO to replace Michael Eisner.
In a press release conveying the same basic message, Mitchell claimed
that, “After a thorough and careful process, comparing both internal
and external candidates against our criteria for CEO, the Board
concluded that Bob Iger was clearly the best qualified individual to
lead this company into the future” (March 13, 2005).
The SaveDisney questions here regarding this announcement
are telling in that they reveal the specific tactics used when
challenging the Board of Director’s actions. First, they questioned the
truth of the claim that the search was indeed a thoughtful and
thorough process. Second, they questioned if the Board had the right
to present these claims in this way (i.e., without input from
shareholders). Finally, they explicitly questioned the sincerity of the
statements. All three of these concerns represent the three types of
validity claims outlined in Habermas’s theory of communicative action,
and they comprise the majority of arguments made by the SaveDisney
team against the management of the Walt Disney Corporation.
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Habermas first suggested that an individual can challenge the
truth of the claim, that is, questioning whether the statement uttered
is honest and true to the facts. In a letter to the Board of Directors
dated February 24, 2004, R. Disney and Gold challenged the truth of
Disney company claims that “The Board and senior management are
committed to the highest standards of corporate governance” (Walt
Disney Company, 2004). R. Disney and Gold wrote:
We believe that you have mischaracterized what actually
transpired with respect to the Company’s executive
compensation decisions regarding Mssrs. Eisner and Iger. If
your announced commitment to transparence and good
governance is truly a reality, why does the Company continue
to oppose in the Delaware Court of Chancery our efforts to
make public the facts regarding the deliberations and outside
advice utilized by Ms. Estrin? ... Is the Board afraid that
Disney shareholders will see that the Boards’ public
statements are inconsistent with actual boardroom conduct?
Ms. Estrin has repeatedly claimed that ‘perception does not
match reality’ regarding governance at The Walt Disney
Company. We agree.
The implication of their probing and lawsuit is that the Board of
Directors has not been honest in portraying its decision-making
process. The charge that the directors are afraid that people may see
that their actions do not match their words directly calls into question
the truth of the Board’s claim of independent decision making
processes. A year later, R. Disney and Gold continued to question the
truth of Mitchell’s claim about conducting a “thorough and careful”
search:
The selection of Bob Iger is yet another example of this
Boards’ breach of faith. The pledge made by Chairman
Mitchell to conduct a bona fide search was a ruse to avoid a
contest at the 2005 annual meeting. Mr. Mitchell’s approach
to good governance is no better than a carny at the fair,
enticing words but in the end the game is rigged. Disney
Shareholders have been conned and their trust in this Board
abused.
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Again, the statement points out the ways in which the Board made
claims that did not represent fact as understood by the SaveDisney
public.
While challenges to the truth of claims are frequently present in
SaveDisney’s rhetoric, these truth claims are often accompanied by
challenges to the rightness of Walt Disney Company claims.
Meisenbach (2006a) noted that there are two senses of right that
scholars address when citing Habermas’ validity claims. The first is
right in the sense of whether the content of the claim is evaluated as
right or just, and the second questions whether it is right for the
speaker to articulate this claim in this situation. In analyzing the
charges made by the SaveDisney team both aspects of this legitimacy
challenge are present—although not always in direct statements. First,
R. Disney, Gold, and the SaveDisney team devoted a great deal of
their argument to challenging how decisions were made in regard to
compensation for executives and in the selection of a new CEO.
Their line of reasoning was that the consultants used in this
process were not truly independent and therefore did not have the
right to make such claims on behalf of the company. In addition, they
challenged the active participation of Michael Eisner in the interviewing
of candidates for the CEO suggesting that since he represented the
problem he should not be involved in the presenting the solution. In
this, they challenged the rightness of any claims that Eisner should
participate in the interviewing process. Overall, any time the
SaveDisney rhetoric challenged the truth of a Disney company
statement, there was an assumed argument that making this claim
was, therefore, wrong. Throughout their statements, SaveDisney thus
challenged the legitimacy of the Board’s actions by questioning the
rightness of their claims.
Finally, the SaveDisney team not only challenged the truth and
rightness of some company claims, it also consistently pointed out
flaws in the sincerity with which certain statements were offered, that
is to say that they argued that the Disney Board stated things that
while technically true, were not offered in a spirit of truthfulness. In
their letter to shareholders on February 12, 2004, R. Disney and Gold
outlined their concerns:
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In their [February 6, 2004] letter, Disney’s directors point to
the rise in the stock price as an example of the value they
would like you to believe has been created. But a short-term
spike in the share price is no substitute for consistent longterm performance. Moreover, a significant portion of that
short-term spike is attributable to a single motion picture,
Finding Nemo, which is the product of the company’s now
disintegrating Pixar partnership. That is a fact that the current
Board and senior management conveniently gloss over in
their self-laudatory proclamation of the company’s
performance. In a vivid demonstration of what is wrong with
current Disney leadership, the Board’s letter touts recent
successes—that still amount to a five-year negative return on
investment—and completely ignore the loss of Pixar.
The crux of this claim is that while the individual Disney
statements are technically true, they are not offered in a spirit of
truthfulness, but rather with the intent to mislead. Throughout this
campaign, R. Disney and Gold repeatedly stated their belief that Eisner
and the Board were not sincere in their claims, that is that they never
truly meant what they said in public. The often-repeated charges of
“smokescreens” and “PR spin” highlighted the degree to which the
SaveDisney team chose the tactic of challenging the sincerity or
truthfulness of the Disney management’s claims. For example, Gold
addressed the ongoing situation at the Walt Disney Company in a
speech that he gave on May 3, 2004. In this speech, Gold referenced
the lyrics of a Gilbert and Sullivan operetta, The Mikado:
Has anything of substance changed between Mr. Eisner and
his former president director? Of course not, nothing has
changed, in part because the Disney board doesn’t get it ...
And in part because they don’t have to get it ... Because
they are playing on a cloth untrue, with twisted cue and
elliptical billiard balls.
The suggestion that the Board is playing on a cloth untrue is another
means of saying that the Board is not being completely forthright in
their statements. This sentiment is echoed in R. Disney and Gold’s
letter to the nonemployee Board members, “While Mr. Eisner’s
announcement at first blush looks like a major change, it is in truth
mere window dressing. What he has really proposed is a scheme to
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arrogate the authority of the Board and maintain the status quo at the
Company’s expense.”
While Habermas’s three types of legitimacy claims are distinct,
they are interrelated and work together in this case to build a
challenge to the legitimacy of the Walt Disney Company Board actions.
The SaveDisney campaign is significant in its use of message
strategies that specifically question the practices of the Walt Disney
Corporation by explicitly and implicitly questioning corporate practice
based on three criteria that directly parallel that of Habermas’s theory
of communicative action and legitimation processes. In this, this case
suggests a means by which activists might organize the content of
their claims (which both activists and corporate representatives can
benefit from knowing) and further provides a set of criteria that can be
used to assess the effectiveness of activist and related legitimacy
challenges.

Implications and Conclusions
Our analysis of the SaveDisney campaign as a whole and the
specific arguments and claims made by Roy Disney, Stan Gold, and
the rest of the SaveDisney campaign reveals a number of significant
and interesting findings. The case presents an intriguing example of
activist rhetoric conducted on a nontraditional issue, in a
nontraditional, but growing form, the Internet. Furthermore, the case
is notable for the sophistication and ultimate success of the campaign.
The case also demonstrates how Habermas’s communicative action
can serve as a framework for understanding how activist publics
generate and organize their arguments.
While the SaveDisney campaign fits within the framework of
activism, it expands research on activism because its focal point is not
a public policy or an environmental issue, but rather a corporate
governance issue. Despite the type of issue addressed, the SaveDisney
campaign fit activist definitions and used activist tactics. The calls to
remove Eisner and restructure the Board were all part of the larger
argument that corporations need to be more accountable to
shareholders and consumers and be more transparent in their business
decisions. Thus, the case demonstrates that research on activist
efforts can be used as a means of understanding campaigns for
corporate reform. Further, those groups seeking corporate reform can
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look to activist tactics as a means of exerting pressure and influence
on organizations.
The SaveDisney campaign stands apart from previous analyses
of organizational legitimacy challenges because of its success and its
sophisticated use of activist-like tactics. Much of this sophistication
draws from the use of arguments and appeals that are directly parallel
to Habermas’s call for communicative action and the use of criticizable
legitimacy claims. Thus, this case demonstrates the salience of
Habermas’s theory of legitimacy for examining legitimacy challenges.
The three Habermasian themes identified in this case work together in
a way that affirms our contention that organizational communication
and public relations scholars would benefit from taking a renewed look
at Habermas’s conceptualization of legitimacy. The rationale for this
claim is found in the call for the ideal speech situation, grounded in
communicative action. That is, the SaveDisney team rationalizes the
need for change by pointing out the ways in which open participation
is not provided for by the Walt Disney Board. Embedded within this
claim is the assertion that the board should be allowing this type of
communicative interaction.
The call for communicative action on a broad level is bolstered
by direct challenges to the truth, right, and truthfulness of the claims
made by the management of the Disney Company. The major premise
of communicative action is that claims that are legitimate are those
that can be contested and debated. That is, publics should be able to
accept or reject a claim.
SaveDisney’s challenges to private corporate utterances (such
as boardroom communications that we could not access) highlighted
how the Disney Board was blocking possibilities for open discussion
and debate. In questioning the truth, right, and truthfulness of
corporate claims they could access, the SaveDisney team successfully
challenged legitimacy. Specifically, shareholder votes suggested that
they agreed with SaveDisney, that corporate Disney claims were
inaccurate, purposefully distorted, and insincerely offered. Thus, the
Habermasian framework enhances understanding of why and how a
corporation’s claims to legitimacy may be challenged by an activist
public. Such knowledge has implications for corporate and activist
practitioners.
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Limitations
While this case study yields significant findings, there are
limitations. Dozier and Lauzen (2000) contended that a problem with
much of public relations research is that it focuses on organizations
with the money and resources to hire an effective public relations
practitioner. Similarly, R. Disney and Gold had unusual and significant
resources at their disposal that helped them to launch and fund a
sophisticated web site and campaign. While we acknowledge this
limitation, Guiniven (2002) pointed out that activist groups are
continuing to grow and develop larger budgets. Furthermore, the
Internet is a highly accessible medium that is increasingly being used
by activist groups (Holloway & Stokes, 2006). In the very recent past,
SaveDisney would have had to rely on mainstream press coverage or
traditional proxy fights, but with little opportunity to gain such
attention. The Internet, however, offers a credible channel for activists
(and status quo supporters) to generate mainstream media interest in
their causes. As such the SaveDisney campaign may be a model for
future activist efforts. Future study of legitimacy challenges originating
from external sources would benefit from including other campaigns
that are not as well-resourced as the SaveDisney campaign.
Second, while doing so highlights the currently underresearched
public side of legitimation, this study is limited in its primary focus on
the activist side of this campaign. The SaveDisney campaign was
complex and extended over the course of 15 months, yet the Walt
Disney Company rarely publicly responded to the campaign. As a
result, the majority of messages examined in this study originate from
the activists who were challenging the Walt Disney Company. As
strategic communication research continues to acknowledge and
embrace a relational view perspective, we hope that future studies will
be able to provide fuller analyses of the messages and rhetorical
strategies of both organizations and their challengers.

Theoretical Implications
Despite these limitations, the use of Habermas’s theory of
communicative action for analyzing the SaveDisney case extends
theoretical understanding of legitimacy in several ways. This case
study provides a much needed initial exemplar of dialogic theory (Kent
& Taylor, 2002) and organizational engagement philosophy (Taylor,
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Vasquez, & Doorly, 2003) in action. This study contributes to this line
of research by explicitly focusing on public challenges that question the
(non)dialogic stance taken by the Walt Disney Company. The
legitimacy challenges made by SaveDisney affirm the desirability of
organizations engaging their publics. Habermas’s theory of
communicative action predates much of the work on dialogic public
relations and the model of engaged public relations. Yet, these
perspectives share a great deal. All three perspectives call for an
analysis of the interaction between organizations and publics. Further,
all advocate for the provision of open debate for understanding. Given
these similarities, it is interesting to note that Habermas is rarely
referenced in these discussions of public relations as dialogue (for an
important exception, see Leeper, 1996).
We find that Habermas’s theory of communicative action
provides a useful complement to the dialogic and engaged perspective
because it offers a specific vision for communication interactions
through the ideal speech situation, and it offers specific bases upon
which the legitimacy of statements might be challenged. In this, the
specific content of organizational and public messages is the key focus
of analysis. Thus, the theory of communicative action has the potential
to contribute a great deal to communication and specifically
organizational strategic communication theory because it focuses on
the need for claims that can be criticized and provides a vocabulary for
examining these claims that is missing from other discussions of
legitimation.
While we argue that a renewed look at Habermas’s claims is
salient across contexts, the role of technology in this case cannot be
overlooked. The use of technology itself does not create conditions for
challenging the legitimacy claims of the corporation; rather, the use of
the internet makes the specific means by which activists might
challenge organizational legitimacy more visible. The web site created
an avenue for increased stakeholder involvement, thus, allowing for
greater opportunity for the claims of the Walt Disney Company to be
challenged. In this, the SaveDisney campaign provides an exemplar of
how technology allows for a more interactive form of strategic
communication (Feldner & Meisenbach, 2007).

Pragmatic Implications
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Although the SaveDisney team never drew upon the language of
Habermas, it naturally challenged the three aspects of validity offered
by Habermas. This recognition is a key finding that suggests other
activist and resistance groups can look to Habermas’s communicative
action as a workable template for constructing arguments. This
connection is also instructive for organizations susceptible to activist
challengers, who should recognize the extent to which publics are
interested in, and even demand, active and meaningful participation.
Furthermore, by being aware of these strategies, challenged
organizations can intentionally bolster the truth, rightness, and
sincerity of their arguments both prior to and after being challenged.
In other words, Habermas’s validity claims provide criteria against
which claims can be evaluated by both messages generators and
receivers. Furthermore, since the presence of these validity claims is
universal, they can be tested in and applied to international and crossnational efforts.
The strategies and tactics used by the activist group SaveDisney
also provide an exemplar for how arguments might be constructed in
other contexts. Since Habermas suggested that the three claims are
up for validation in any utterance, their applicability extends well
beyond activist rhetoric. For example, shareholders and employees
interested in agitating for change from within can look to these
strategies to structure their challenges in ways that directly address
corporate claims. Similarly, corporations can challenge the truth,
rightness, and sincerity of activist group claims. Organizations
everywhere can also roll out new practices and products by initially
presenting strong claims to truth, rightness, and sincerity. Thus a
Habermasian approach to legitimacy opens up a method for analyzing,
challenging, and creating a variety of arguments.
Finally, the case points to the use of the Internet as a means by
which stakeholders might gain greater voice in corporate governance
processes (Feldner & Meisenbach, 2007). Unlike traditional media
outlets that present greater barriers for activists to be heard, the
Internet provides relatively few such obstacles. As a result, both
internal and external audiences are able to challenge the legitimacy of
corporate policies no matter how large or small they may be.
SaveDisney also serves as a cautionary tale to corporations. The Walt
Disney Company chose to offer few responses to the SaveDisney
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campaign. A choice that some suggest allowed for the enormous
impact and success of the SaveDisney campaign. As the use of
technology increases and shareholder interest in corporate governance
grows, companies should expect this type of campaign to become
more common.

Conclusion
The primary contribution of this analysis is greater
understanding of the ways in which activist publics and stakeholder
groups challenge legitimacy claims of other, more established
organizations. In particular, it highlights the degree to which these
publics tend to challenge specific actions based on their truth,
rightness, and sincerity.
Future research can build on these findings in a number of
ways. First, one striking aspect of the legitimacy challenges initiated
by the SaveDisney campaign is their focus on particular aspects of the
Disney Corporation. The SaveDisney managers carefully targeted
particular departments and practices while shielding the larger
corporate purpose from criticism. In this, this case provides support
for and a potential avenue for extension of Boyd’s (2000) actional
legitimation. Specifically future work should look at legitimacy
challenges that are not focused on specific actions but rather that
target specific corporate units. Second, the challenges mounted by the
SaveDisney campaign about the lack of company responsiveness can
be seen as resulting from a violation of discourse ethics by the Walt
Disney Company (Habermas, 1990; Leeper, 1996; Meisenbach,
2006a). Analysis of this case in the context of discourse ethics might
yield other interesting findings.
At the end of this campaign, it seems to public eyes that R.
Disney, Gold and their supporters did indeed save Disney and restore
the magic in particular ways. The case is captivating in many respects
due to its sophisticated persuasive strategies and its success in forcing
change at the corporate level. Beyond this, the case of SaveDisney
creates inroads for scholars and practitioners of strategic
communication as it suggests ways to embrace dialogue and
strengthen both understanding and powerful, yet ethical, use of
legitimacy challenges.
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Notes
1. Botan and Taylor (2004) described this kind of assumption
about publics as tied to a functional perspective, which “sees
publics and communication as tools or means to achieve
organizational ends” (p. 651).
2. Habermas (1979) earlier discussed four validity claims. The
fourth claim is to the intelligibility of the claim, deciding whether
the listener can hear and understand the utterance. Leeper
(1996) included all four in his brief analysis of claims used by
Exxon in the Valdez incident, but since (a) all examples
discussed under intelligibility were also discussed and part of
consideration of the rightness and sincerity claims, and (b)
Habermas (1984, 1987) dropped the intelligibility claim in his
later development of validity claims, we do not develop it as a
separate claim in this analysis.
3. The primary author downloaded the entire web site as it existed
on May 1, 2006. In addition the authors used the web archive,
waybackmachine.org, to access all versions of the SaveDisney
web site. All dates listed in this text for web site materials
reference the dates posted on the material on the SaveDisney
web site. We believe this indicates the date the material was
published.
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